Abstract. We present a new general multiparty computation protocol for the cryptographic scenario which is universally composable -in particular, it is secure against an active and adaptive adversary, corrupting any minority of the parties. The protocol is as efficient as the best known statically secure solutions, in particular the number of bits broadcast (which dominates the complexity) is Ω(nk|C|), where n is the number of parties, k is a security parameter, and |C| is the size of a circuit doing the desired computation. Unlike previous adaptively secure protocols for the cryptographic model, our protocol does not use non-committing encryption, instead it is based on homomorphic threshold encryption, in particular the Paillier cryptosystem.
Introduction
The problem of multiparty computation (MPC) dates back to the papers by Yao [14] and Goldreich et al. [11] . What was proved there was basically that a collection of n parties can efficiently compute the value of an n-input function, s.t. everyone learns the correct result, but no other new information. More precisely, these protocols can be proved secure against a polynomial time bounded adversary who can corrupt a set of less than n/2 parties initially, and then make them behave as he likes, we say that the adversary is active. Even so, the adversary should not be able to prevent the correct result from being computed and should learn nothing more than the result and the inputs of corrupted parties. Because the set of corrupted parties is fixed from the start, such an adversary is called static or non-adaptive.
Proving security of the protocol from [11] requires a complexity assumption, such as existence of trapdoor one-way permutations. This is because the model of communication considered there is s.t. the adversary may see every message sent that are decrypted, and this turns out to be essential for our proof of security to go through.
We prove our protocols secure in the framework for universally composable (UC) security by Canetti [3] . This framework allows to define the security of general reactive tasks, rather than just evaluation of functions. This allows us to prove that our protocol does not just provide secure function evaluation, but is in fact equivalent to what we call an arithmetic black box (ABB). An ABB can be thought of as a secure general-purpose computer. Every party can in private specify inputs to the ABB, and any majority of parties can ask it to perform any feasible computational task and make the result (and only the result) public. Moreover the ABB can be invoked several times and keeps an internal state between invocations. This point of view allows for easier and more modular proofs, and also makes it easier to use our protocols as tools in other constructions.
An Informal Description
In this section, we give a completely informal introduction to some main ideas. All the concepts introduced here will be treated more formally later in the paper. We will assume that from the start, the following scenario has been established: we have a semantically secure threshold public-key system given, i.e., there is a public encryption key pk known by all parties, while the matching private decryption key has been shared among the parties, s.t. each party holds a share of it.
We will use a threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem, so the message space is Z N for some RSA modulus N . For a plaintext a ∈ Z N , we let a denote an encryption of a. We have certain homomorphic properties: from encryptions a, b, anyone can easily compute (deterministically) an encryption of a + b, which we denote a b. We also require that from an encryption a and a constant α ∈ Z N , it is easy to compute a random encryption of αa, which we denote α a. This immediately gives us an algorithm for subtracting.
We can then sketch how a computation was performed securely in the (statically secure) protocol from [7] : we assume the desired computation is specified as a circuit doing additions and multiplications in Z N -This allows us to simulate a Boolean circuit in a straightforward way using 0/1 values in R. The protocol then starts by having each party publish encryptions of his input values and give zero-knowledge proofs that he knows these values. Then any operation involving addition or multiplication by constants can be performed with no interaction: if all parties know encryptions a, b of input values to an addition gate, all parties can immediately compute an encryption of the output a + b. This leaves only the problem of multiplications: Given encryptions a, b (where it may be the case that no parties knows a nor b), compute securely an encryption of c = ab. This can be done by the following protocol (which is a slightly optimized version of the protocol from [7] ): 
At the final stage we know encryptions of the output values, which we just decrypt using threshold decryption. Intuitively this is secure if the encryption is secure because, other than the outputs, only random values or values that should be known to the adversary are ever decrypted. This intuition was proved for a static adversary in [7] . But in the UC framework, where the adversary is adaptive, it is well known that there are several additional problems:
Loosely speaking, a proof of security requires building a simulator that simulates in an indistinguishable way the adversary's view of a real attack, while having access only to data the adversary is supposed to know at any given time. This means that for instance in the input stage the simulator needs to show the adversary encryptions that are claimed to contain the inputs of honest parties. At this time the simulator does not know these inputs, so it must encrypt some arbitrary values. This is fine for the time being, but if one of the honest parties are later corrupted, the simulator learns the real inputs of this party and must reveal them to the adversary along with a simulation of all internal data of the party. The simulator is now stuck, since the real inputs most likely are not consistent with the arbitrary values encrypted earlier.
We handle this problem using a combination of two tricks: first, we include in the public key an encryption K = 1. Then, we redefine the encryption method, and fix the rule that to encrypt a value a, one computes a K. Under normal circumstances, this will be an encryption of a. The point, however, is that in the simulation, the simulator can decide what K should be, and will set K = 0. Then all encryptions used in the simulation will contain 0, in fact -using the algebraic properties of the encryption scheme -the simulator can compute C as an encryption of 0, store the random coins used for this and later make it seem as if C was computed as C = a K for any a it desires.
However, the simulator must also be able to find the input values the adversary supplies, immediately as the encryptions are made public. This is not possible if it only sees encryptions of 0. We therefore redefine the way inputs are supplied: for each input value x of party P i , P i uses the UC commitment scheme of [9] to make a commitment commit(x) to x, and also sends an encryption C = x K. Finally he proves in zero-knowledge that commit(x) contains the same value as C. This can be done efficiently because [9] is also based on Paillier encryption, and the UC property of the commitments precisely allows the simulator to extract inputs of corrupted parties and fake it on behalf of honest parties.
A final problem we face is that the simulator will not be able to "cheat" in the threshold decryption protocol. The key setup for this protocol fixes the shares of the private key even in the simulation, so a ciphertext can only be decrypted to the value it actually contains. Of course, when decrypting the outputs, the correct results should be produced both in simulation and real life, and so we have a problem since we just said that all ciphertexts in the simulation really contain 0. We solve this by randomizing all ciphertexts before they are decrypted: we include another fixed encryption R = 0 in the public key. Then, given ciphertext C, the parties cooperate to create an encryption r R, where r is a (secret) randomly chosen value that depends on input from all parties. Then we compute C (r R) and decrypt this ciphertext. Under normal circumstances, it will of course contain the same plaintext as C. But in the simulation, the simulator will set R = 1, and "cheat" in the process where r is chosen, s.t. r = a, where a is the value the simulator wants the decryption to return. This works, since in the simulation any C actually encrypts 0.
Preliminaries
Notation. Throughout the paper k will denote the security parameter. For a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A we will use a ← A(x; r) to denote running A on input x and uniformly random bits r ∈ {0, 1} p(|x|) producing output a; Here p(·) is a polynomial upper bounding the running time of A.
Non-erasure Σ-protocols. Consider a binary relation R ⊆ {0, 1}
* × {0, 1} * where (x, w) ∈ R can be checked in PPT. By L(R) we denote the set {x ∈ {0, 1} * |∃w ∈ {0, 1} * ((x, w) ∈ R)}. A non-erasure Σ-protocol for relation R is six PPT algorithms (A, l, Z, B, hvs, rbs, xtr) (and an integer l) specifying a three move, public randomness, honest verifier zero-knowledge protocol with special soundness. The prover has input (x, w) ∈ R and the verifier has input x. The prover first computes a message a ← A(x, w; r A ) and sends a to V . Then V returns a l-bit challenge e. The prover then computes a response to the challenge z ← Z(x, w, r a , e) and sends z to the verifier. The verifier then computes b ← B(x, a, e, z), where b ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether to believe that the prover knows a valid witness w or not. The algorithm hvs is called the honest verifier simulator and takes as input x ∈ L(R), e ∈ {0, 1} l and a uniformly random bit-string r hvs and produces as output (a, z) which is supposed to be distributed as the (a, z) produced by a honest prover with instance x receiving challenge e -this is defined formally below. The algorithm rbs is called the random bits simulator. It takes as input (x, w) ∈ R, a challenge e ∈ {0, 1} l and bits r hvs , which we think of as the random bits used by hvs in a run (a, z) ← hvs(x, e; r hvs ), and it produces as output a bit-string r A s.t. a = A(x, w; r A ) and z = Z(x, w, r A , e). I.e. if (a, z) is the messages simulated using hvs given just x ∈ L(R), then if w s.t. (x, w) ∈ R later becomes known it is possible to construct random bits r A s.t. it looks like (a, z) was generated as a ← A(x, w; r A ) and z ← Z(x, w, r A , e). Finally xtr is a knowledge extractor, which given two correct conversations with the same first message can compute a witness. We now formalize these requirements along with completeness. Special soundness: For all x ∈ S and (a, e, z) and (a, e , z ) where e = e , B(x, a, e, z) = 1 and B(x, a, e , z ) = 1, we have that (x, xtr(x, a, e, z, e , z )) ∈ R.
Non-erasure Concurrent Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
In [8] a concurrent zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge is presented based on any Σ-protocol. The protocol assumes that the prover P and verifier V agree on a key K for a trapdoor commitment scheme. The prover has input (x, w) ∈ R and the verifier knows x. The protocol proceeds as follows. To simulate the protocol without w one assumes that the simulator knows the trapdoor t of K. The simulator can then let c be a fake commitment and when it receives e compute (a, z) ← hvs(x, e; r hvs ), use t to compute r c s.t. c = commit K (a; r c ) and send (a, r c , z). As observed in [9] , if the Σ-protocol is nonerasure the above protocol is adaptively secure. Assume namely that P is corrupted and the simulator learns a witness. Then compute r A ← rbs(x, w, e, r hvs ) and by special non-erasure honest verifier zero-knowledge the simulation is perfect. In the following we will call this to patch the state of the proof of knowledge.
The prover generates a ← A(x, w; r
In [8] a knowledge extractor xtr is given working as follows. Assume K is a random commitment key so that commit K is computational binding and assume a corrupt prover succeeds in giving an acceptable proof with probability p say. Then by rewinding and giving new random challenges e until a proof is accepted again we get, e.w.n.p., values a, e, z, a, e , z s.t. B(x, a, e, z) = B(x, a, e , z ) = 1 and e = e and can compute a witness w for x. The expected number of rechallenges needed is 1 p so if we run a proof and extract if a correct proof is given the expected number of rechallenges used in the extraction is p 1 p where p is the probability that the proof is accepted in the first place. This generalizes to several proofs run concurrently. Each time a proof is accepted invoke xtr and get a witness. If the context in which the proofs are run is PPT, then the running time, and the number of proofs, is bounded by a polynomial P , and so each invocation of xtr has expected running time less than P which with a total of at most P invocations, by the linearity of expectation, gives an expected polynomial running time of at most P 2 . Note that for the zero-knowledge simulator it is enough that K is a trapdoor commitment key, whereas for knowledge soundness it was needed that the key was random to ensure that commit K is computational binding. We can therefore let V pick the key K and send it to P . All we need to ensure is that is the simulator can get its hands on the trapdoor of K. We will use the protocol and simulator exactly this way later.
Universally Composable Security
In this section we give a sketch of the notion of universally composable security of synchronous protocols for the authenticated link model. Except for some minor technical differences it is the synchronous model described in [3] .
A protocol π consists of n parties P 1 , . . . , P n , all PPT interactive Turing machines (ITMs). The execution of a protocol takes place in the presence of an environment Z, also a PPT ITM, which supplies inputs to and receives outputs from the parties. Z also models the adversary of the protocol, and so schedules the activation of the parties and corrupts parties. In each round r each party P i sends a message m i,j,r to each party P j ; The message m i,i,r is the state of P i after round r, and m i,i,0 = (k, r i ) will be the security parameter and the random bits used by P i . We model open channels by showing the messages {m i,j,r } j∈ [n] \{i} to Z, where [n] = {1, . . . , n}. In each round Z inputs a value x i,r to P i and receives and output y i,r from P i . We write the r'th activation of
. We model that the parties cannot reliably erase their state by giving r i to Z when P i is corrupted. In the following C will denote the set of corrupted parties and H = [n] \ C. In detail the real-life execution proceeds as follows. Init: The input is k, random bits r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n and an auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * . Set r = 0 and
Then input k and z to Z and activate Z. Environment activation: When activated Z outputs one of the following commands:
. Commands are handled as described below and the environment is then activated again. We require that all honest parties are activated between two (end round) commands. When a (guess b) command is given the execution stops. Party activation: {m j,i,r−1 } j∈H were defined in the previous round; Add these to {m j,i,r−1 } j∈C from the environment and compute
End round: Give the value {y i,r } i∈H defined in Party activation to Z and set r = r + 1.
The result of the execution is the bit b output by Z. We denote this bit by REAL π,Z (k, r, z). This defines a Boolean distribution ensemble REAL π,Z = {REAL π,Z (k, z)} k∈N,z∈{0,1} * , where we take r to be uniformly random.
To define the security of a protocol an ideal functionality F is specified. The ideal functionality is a PPT ITM with n input tapes and n output tapes which we think of as being connected to n parties. The input-output behavior of the ideal functionality defines the desired input-output behavior of the protocol. To be able to specify protocols which are allowed to leak certain information F has a special output tape (SOT) on which it writes this information. The ideal functionality also has the special input tape (SIT). Each time F is given an input for P i it writes some value on the SOT modeling the part of the input which is not required to be kept secret. When F receives the input (activate v) a round is over, in response to which it writes a value on the output tape for each party. The value v models the inputs from the corrupted parties. When a party P i is corrupted the ideal functionality receives the input (corrupt i) on the SIT.
We then say that a protocol π realizes an ideal functionality F if there exists an interface, also called simulator, S which given access to F can simulate a run of π with the same input-output behavior. In doing this S is given the inputs of the corrupted parties, and the information leaked on the SOT of F, and can specify the inputs of corrupted parties. In detail the ideal process, proceeds as follows.
Init:
The input is k, random bits r = (r F , r S ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) 2 and an auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * . Set r = 0 and C = ∅. Provide S with r S , provide F with r F and give k and z to Z and activate Z. Environment activation: Z is defined exactly as in the real-word, but now commands are handled by S, as described below. Party activation: Give {m j,i,r−1 } i∈C to S and give x i,r to F on the input tape for P i and run F to get some value v F on the SOT. This value is given to S which is then required to compute some value {m i,j,r } j∈[n]\{i} which is given to Z. Corrupt: When Z corrupts P i , S is given the values x i,0 , y i,0 , x i,1 , . . . exchanged between Z and F for P i . Furthermore (corrupt i) is input on the SIT of F and F writes a value on the SOT; This value is given to S. Then S outputs some value r i which is given to Z. Set C = C ∪ {i}. End round: S is activated and produces a value v. Then (activate v) is input to F which produces output {y i,r } i∈ [n] . Then {y i,r } i∈C is given to S and {y i,r } i∈H is given to Z. Set r = r + 1.
The result of the ideal-process is the bit b output by Z. We denote this bit by IDEAL F ,S,Z (k, r, z). This defines a Boolean distribution ensemble IDEAL F ,S,Z = {IDEAL F ,S,Z (k, z)} k∈N,z∈{0,1} * .
Definition 1. We say that π t-realizes F if there exists an interface S s.t. for all environments Z corrupting at most t parties it holds that IDEAL
We then define the hybrid models. The G-hybrid model is basically the reallife model where the parties in addition to the communication lines also have access to an ideal functionality G. In each round all parties give an input to G and receive the output from G in the following round. The inputs to the SIT of G are given by Z and Z receives the outputs on the SOT. When defining security of a protocol in a hybrid model the interface S must in addition to the communication and internal state of parties also simulate the values exchanged between G and Z. We call this a hybrid interface.
Definition 2. We say that π t-realizes F in the G-hybrid model if there exists a hybrid interface S s.t. for all environments Z corrupting at most t parties it holds that IDEAL
A universal composability theorem can be proven for this framework. I.e. if a protocol realizes a given functionality it can be replaced for the functionality in all contexts. The above description easily generalizes to the case of several ideal functionalities in a hybrid model. In particular we will in the protocols following assume that the parties have access to an ideal functionality F BA for doing Byzantine Agreement. It expects a bit b i as input from all parties. If all honest parties agree on a value v, then F BA outputs v to all parties. Otherwise the environment is allowed to determine the output through the SIT. We also assume a broadcast channel, which can easily be model with an ideal functionality.
The Paillier Cryptosystem and Some Tools
In this section we describe the Paillier cryptosystem [13] . The public key is a k-bit RSA modulus pk = N = pq, where p an q are chosen s.t. p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1 for primes p , q , and both p and q have k/2 bits. The plaintext space is Z N and the ciphertext space is Z * N 2 . To encrypt a ∈ Z N , one chooses r ∈ Z * N uniformly at random and computes the ciphertext as E pk (a; r) = g a r N mod N 2 , where the element g = N + 1 has order N in Z * N 2 . The encryption function is homomorphic in the following sense E pk (a 1 ; r 1 )E pk (a 2 ; r 2 ) mod N 2 = E pk (a 1 a 2 mod N ; r 1 r 2 mod N ) and E pk (a; r) b = E pk (ab mod N ; r b mod N ). The private key is e.g. sk = φ(N )(φ(N ) −1 mod N ), and it is straightforward to verify that ((N + 1) a r N ) sk mod N 2 = Na + 1 from which a mod N can be computed. Given a one can then compute r N and r = (r N )
Under an appropriate complexity assumption -the DCRA -this system is semantic secure. The DCRA states that random elements in Z * N 2 are computationally indistinguishable from random elements of form r N mod N 2 . For any ciphertext K = E pk (a; r K ) we can consider the function
If r is uniformly random in Z * N , then s m r mod N is uniformly random in Z * N and so E pk,K (m; r) is a uniformly random encryption of am mod N . Notice that if a ∈ Z * N , then from K and c = E pk,K (m; r) and sk we can efficiently compute m. Therefore E pk,K (m; r) is again a semantically secure encryption function. If on the other hand a = 0, then E pk,K (m; r) is a uniformly random encryption of 0. So, E pk,K (m; r) can be seen as a perfect hiding commitment scheme commit pk,K (m; r) = E pk,K (m; r). It is trivial to see that commit pk,K (m; r) is computationally binding. If K ∈ E pk (1), then commit pk,K (m; r) would be perfect binding, so no algorithm can find two different openings. An algorithm finding two different openings when K = E pk (0) would therefore distinguish encryptions of 1 from encryptions K of 0.
Notice furthermore that if K = E pk (0; r K ) and r K is known, then given arbitrary m, m ∈ Z N and r ∈ Z * N we can compute r = s m−m r mod N , so that E pk,K (m; r) = E pk,K (m ; r ). All in all we have argued that if K = E pk (0; r K ) is a random encryption, then commit K (m; r) is a perfect hiding computationally binding trapdoor commitment scheme with trapdoor t K . When considering values K ∈ Z * N 2 as keys we will call keys of the form K = E pk (0; t K ) trapdoor keys and we will call keys of the form K = E pk (a; s) for a ∈ Z * n encryption keys. We now describe a commitment scheme from [9] .
A UC Commitment Scheme. First we have to introduce a so-called doubletrapdoor commitment scheme. Consider a trapdoor commitment scheme with key K = (K 1 , K 2 ), where K 1 and K 2 are both encryptions of 0. We commit as We note for later use that the distribution of the random bits is independent of which trapdoor is used. Note that the domain of commit K can be extended by committing block-wise. Here is the protocol from [9] .
Setup:
We assume that commitment sender S and receiver R agree on two independently chosen Paillier public-keys N and N and a commitment key
If R is honest at the beginning of the protocol we furthermore assume that t 1 and t 2 are uniformly random. Commitment: S commits to s ∈ Z N as follows. 
In [9] a simulator S commit for the UC framework is given which has the property that given any so-called hitting commitment (L, c s ) it can simulate a run of the protocol which results in R outputting (L, c s ). All the simulator needs to do this is the trapdoor(s) of K when R is corrupted and an opening (s, r s ) of (L, c s ) when S is corrupted. The simulator has some properties given in Theorem 1. Consider a simulation with hitting commitment (L, c s ) Escape-Secure Threshold Decryption. In this section we introduce the adaptively secure threshold decryption protocol from [12] . We first make a definition which will help us state the results precisely. We will introduce a weaker notion of UC security, which we call escape-security. An escape-simulator S is defined as a simulator in the UC framework augmented with a special escape state. An escapesimulation IDEAL F ,S,Z (k, z) proceeds exactly as in the UC framework except that if S enters the escape state, then the simulation terminates with the output ⊥ -we say that the simulation was escaped. For environment Z and values k ∈ N and z ∈ {0, 1} * of the security parameter we define the simulation probability by We now proceed to present the result from [12] in the above framework. Let (G, E, D) be a public-key cryptosystem and consider the following ideal functionality F (G,E,D) for threshold decryption.
Theorem 1.
s Z (k, z) = 1 − Pr[IDEAL F ,S,Z (k, z) = ⊥]. When s Z (k, z) is non-zero we define the conditional probabilities c Z (k, z, b) = Pr[IDEAL F ,S,Z (k,z)=b] s Z (k,z) . When s Z (k, z) is zero we define c Z (k, z, b) = 1 2 for b ∈ {0, 1}. Then (c Z (k, z, 0), c Z (k, z, 1)) defines a
Init:
In the first round it generates (pk, sk) ← G(k) and outputs pk to all parties and to the adversary.
Decryption: After a public key pk has been output we allow the parties to input a ciphertext C for decryption in any round and we also allow that more than one ciphertext is input in each round. Each ciphertext is handled as follows: If in some round r all honest parties input C, then send (C, m = D sk (C)) to the adversary 1 and in round r + 6 return m to all parties.
In our terminology here, what is proved in [12] is:
There exists a protocol π pal escape-securely realizing F pal with simulation probability
In [12] the key distribution is handled using a trusted party or a general MPC. Here we model this by assuming the key is generated by an ideal functionality F pal,key−gen ; It generates a random threshold key (N, pv, sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) where N is a random Paillier public key, sk 1 , . . . , sk n are the private key shares of the parties and pv is public values used in the protocol for a.o.t. checking decryption shares. In [12] a decryption protocol π pal,dec using this key is then described.
Their simulator consists of two parts. A simulator S pal,key−gen which given the public key pk from the ideal functionality simulates a key (N, pv, sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) = S pal,key−gen (pk) with the property that (N, pv) is computationally indistinguishable from a real key. Furthermore a simulator S pal,dec for the decryption protocol is given, which again is computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol as long as the simulation is not escaped. We need a last property of the protocol. Given a random Paillier key (pk, sk) it is possible to generate a threshold key (pk, pv, sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) with the same distribution as F pal,key−gen . We write (pk, pv, sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) = SingleToThesh(pk, sk).
An Arithmetic Black Box
The ABB is an ideal functionality F ABB . Initially F ABB outputs a uniformly random key pk = N to all parties, defining the ring Z N that F ABB does arithmetic over. In each activation it expects a command from all honest parties and carries out the command if all honest parties agree. Typically agreement means that the parties gave the same command, e.g. (x ← x 1 + x 2 ), but this does not always make sense. If e.g. party P i is to load a secret value s into variable x, using the command (P i : x ← s), of course the other parties cannot acknowledge by giving the same command. In this case they input (P i : x ←?); The intended meaning is that P i is allowed to define x using a value unknown to the other parties. If two honest parties ever disagree F ABB goes corrupted in the following sense: It outputs its entire current state and all future inputs on the SOT. Besides this it lets the environment determine all future outputs through the SIT. The functionality F ABB holds a list of defined variable names x and stores a value val(x) ∈ Z N for each. For all commands we require that variables on the right hand side of ← are defined and that x is defined when a (output x) command is given. In the command (P i : x ← x 1 · x 2 ) we require that x 1 was defined by a (P i : x 1 ←?) command. A violation of these requirements will make F ABB go corrupted. Each time a variable x is defined F ABB outputs (defined x) to all parties. Except for the s in (P i : x ← s) all input values are output on the SOT.
Init:
Let c be the number of rounds used for setting up the keys in the reallife protocol. When the init command is given the ABB simply runs for c rounds ignoring all inputs. Then it generates a random Paillier key (N, sk) and outputs pk to all parties and outputs (N, sk) to the adversary.
val(x) = s in round r + 8. If in a round before round r + 8 P i is corrupted and the adversary inputs (change s ) on the SIT, then val(x) = s , and if the adversary inputs fail, then val(x) is not defined.
, (this is an extra requirement as P i might be corrupted), then in round r + 4 define val(x) = val(x 1 )val(x 2 ) mod N . If in a round before round r + 5 the adversary inputs fail on the SIT and P i is corrupted, then val(x) is not defined. Output: On (output x) in round r output (output x = val(x)) on the SIT and output (output x = val(x)) to all parties in round r + 12.
The functionality has no general multiplication command, but running in the F ABB -hybrid model, parties can do a multiplication of any two variable using the multiplication protocol from the introduction. We now describe a protocol π ABB realizing F ABB . A variable x with val(x) = s is represented by an encryption enc(x) = E pk,K (s) on which the parties agree.
The protocol runs in the hybrid model with access to two copies of the functionality F pal,key−gen described in Section 6. We call the public key returned by the first copy pk = N , and we assume that the first copy also returns two random encryptions K = E pk (1) and R = E pk (0). We call the public key returned by the second copy pk = N , and we assume that the second copy also return 3n random encryptions
The key K j,0 is for for running the proof of knowledge protocol from Section 4 with the relation in Section 6 with P j as verifier. We will denote this by P i proves to P j . The double-trapdoor key K j = (N , K j,1 , K j,2 ) will be used for running the universally composable commitment scheme in Section 6 with P j as receiver to generate commitments under N . When P i is the committer with some value s we will denote this by P i commits to s to P j . In the first round the parties call the ideal functionalities and wait until all keys are returned.
Load: Below we use M as the key under which encryptions are made. When the parties carry out the load commands given from the environment they always use M = K. However the implementation of Output also uses the load command as an internal sub-routine, with M = R. 1. P i computes S = E pk,M (s; r S ) and broadcasts S. 2. For j = i party P i commits to s to P j . Denote the commitment by (L j , c s,j , r s,j ). 3. For j = i party P i proves to P j with instance x = (pk, M, S, L j , c s,j ) and witness (s, r S , s, r s,j ). 4. For j = i party P j inputs 1 to F BA iff the zero-knowledge proof given by P i to P j was accepted. 5. Wait until F BA outputs a bit b. If b = 1 the parties set enc(x) = S.
Private multiplication: We assume that P i knows (s, r s ) s.t. enc(x 1 ) = E pk,K (s; r s ).
1. P i computes X = E pk,enc(x2) (s; r X ) and broadcasts X. 2. For j = i party P i proves to P j with instance x = (pk, K, enc(x 1 ), enc(x 2 ), X) and witness (s, r S , s, r X ), and as above the parties run a BA to determine whether to accept the proof. 3. If the result of the BA is 1 the parties set enc(x) = X. Output: 1. P i generates random r i ∈ Z N and loads it into variable x i using M = K. Let {C j } j =i denote the commitments used in Step 2 of the load. 2. Parti P i loads r i into variable y i using M = R, but reuses the commitments {C j } j =i from the previous load. If a party P i input 0 to the BA in the previous load for P j , then input 0 again in this load. 3. Let I be a size t + 1 subset of the set of indices i for which y i is now defined. Let {λ I i } i∈I be degree t Lagrange coefficients interpolating from {f (i)} i∈I to f (0) over Z N . Compute S = i∈I enc(y i )
We assume some fixed way of picking the subset I so that all parties agree on T . 4. The parties run π pal,dec from Section 6 on T and take as their output the value v returned by π pal,dec .
Due to space limitations we can only sketch the proof of Theorem 3, a full proof will appear in the Ph.D. dissertation of the second author. In the proof we construct an interface S simulating π ABB in the ideal process with access to F ABB . The simulator runs a copy of the protocol π ABB and keeps it consistent with the inputs and outputs of F ABB in ideal process (in which S is run). In simulating π ABB , S must provide inputs to F ABB on behalf of the corrupted parties. For all commands except Load and Private Multiplication only the inputs from honest parties are consider by F ABB . However for a load (P i : x ←?) and a private multiplication (P i : x ← x 1 · x 2 ) the input from S matters. In the first case S must provide an input (P i : x ← s) for x to be defined and in the second case S must provide the input (P i : x ← x 1 · x 2 ) for x to be defined. Whether the simulator supplies these inputs, and the value of s, depends on Z: If Z lets P i participate in the simulation of π ABB in a way which results in the honest parties defining enc(x) to hold some encryption, then S will provide the input to F ABB and in the case of a Load it will determine an appropriate value of s. The initialization is simulated as follows::
Init: For the first copy it receives the key (pk = N, sk) from F ABB and computes (N, pv, sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) = SingleToThesh(pk, sk).(1) Then it computes K = E pk (0; r K ) and computes R = E pk (1; r R ) and outputs (pk, pv, sk i , R, K) to party P i . For the second copy it generates N and all the keys K j,l = E N (0; r j,l ) itself and distributes these as in the protocol. When running the simulator for the zero-knowledge proofs with P j as verifier the key K j,0 is given to the simulator, and if P j is corrupted t j,0 is given to the simulator. Notice that we do not use sk so the commitment schemes E pk ,Kj,0 will be computationally binding as required. When running the simulator for a commitment from P i to P j the key (K j,1 , K j,2 ) is given to the simulator, and if P j is corrupted t j,1 and t j,2 are given to the simulator. Notice that except for K and R this initialization simulates perfectly the protocol.
The simulator maintains the invariant that a variable x is defined in the simulated π ABB iff it is defined in F ABB . Furthermore the simulator maintains that for all defined variables x it knows ran(x) s.t. enc(x) = E pk (0; ran(x)). These values are used for trapdoor openings under K, e.g. in the simulation of the load command:
Load: We only describe how to simulate for M = K as for all loads with key R we will actually know the value to load, so the 'simulation' can be done by running the protocol. On (P i : x ←?), if P i is honest we proceed as follows: 1. P i computes S = E pk (0; r 0 ) and broadcasts S. If P i is corrupted after this step, then we learn (P i : x ← s) from the ideal process. Then using r K and r 0 compute r S s.t. S = E pk,K (s; r S ) and uses r S as the internal state of P i . 2. For j = i party P i simulates a trapdoor commitment to P j giving commitment (L j , c s,j , ?). If P i is corrupted in or after this step, then first patch as as above, and then patch (L j , c s,j , ?) to s. 3. For each party P j where j = i party P i run the simulator from Section 4 with instance x = (pk, K, S, (L j , c s,j )). If P i is corrupted after this
Step, then first patch as above. Then w = (s, r S , r s,j ) is a witness to x. Give this witness to the simulator from Section 4 to patch the state of the proof of knowledge. 4. The parties execute the BA following the protocol. If the result is 1 the parties set enc(x) = S and ran(x) = r 0 . For corrupted P i the simulator inputs (P i : x ← 0) to F ABB on behalf of P i and then lets the honest parties follow the protocol. If the BA fails the simulator inputs fail on the SIT of F ABB . If the broadcast value enc(x) = S is accepted, then the simulator must at the end of the load input (change s) on behalf of P i on the SIT of F ABB . Since the BA output 1, at least t+1 parties input 1, so at least one party P j which is still honest input 1. Let (L j , c s,j ) be the commitment received by P j . Since the proof received was accepted, P i can, e.w.n.p., open (L j , c s,j ) and S to the same value, s say -i.e. if we could rewind we could extract such a value. By Theorem 1 we can assume that if S was sent by the adversary, then L j is a binding key, so (L j , s j ) can only be opened to one value. Therefore we can using sk decrypt(2) (L j , c s,j ) to obtain the value s to which P i can open S. The intuition here is that if K had been an encryption of 1, then this value s, to which P i can open S, would indeed be its plaintext value, so we have extracted the 'plaintext' of S. If P i is honest at the onset of the load but is corrupted before the third message of the commitment protocol is sent, i.e. in round r + 2, then the environment might send a commitment (L j , c s,j ) to a value s different from the s which has already been input to F ABB , and we have no guarantee that L j is an encryption key. However, we have no need to decrypt either: Since the simulator sent S it patched the state of P i to be consistent with S = enc pk,K (s; r S ). So, if K had been a binding key, then the state of P i would be consistent with F ABB . In all cases, if enc(c) is accepted the simulator decrypts(3) enc(x) to learn random bits ran(x) s.t. enc(x) = E pk (0; ran(x)).
A private multiplication is simulated similarly, letting X = E pk (0; r 0 ) and if s becomes known, computing r X s.t. X = E pk,enc(x2) (s; r X ) -in doing this we use that we know ran(x 2 ) s.t. enc(x 2 ) = E pk (0; ran(x 2 )). Linear combination is simulated by letting enc(x) = g Output: On input (output x = v) from F ABB we know that all honest parties got the input (output x) and will output v in 12 rounds. We cannot use the simulator from Section 6 to simulate a decryption to v, as the inconsistent party might get corrupted. Instead we cheating in the randomization as to make T an encryption of v, and then decrypt honestly.
1. For honest P i run the load command by committing to uniformly random elements r i under trapdoor keys. 2. Let J be the indices j of corrupted parties for which the load into x j succeeded. If |J| < t, then add the indices of some uniformly random honest parties until |J| = t and for those parties, let r i = r i . Pick a random degree t + 1 polynomial f (j) s.t. f (j) = r j for j ∈ J and f (0) = v. Then for the honest parties set r i = f (i) and patch the load into x i to be consistent with s = r i . Then load r i into y i under R by running the load protocol honestly. This is possible as the previous load is now consistent with r i .
